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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Competition and Competition Law 
When talking about competition law, we should first define competition. In 
simple terms, competition is fighting between rivals. Most economics text-
books neglect to provide a direct definition of the term.1 Thus, we can turn to 
dictionaries. Merriam-Webster defines competition in business as "the effort 
of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a third 
party by offering the most favourable terms". Competing parties make offers 
and the third parties decide which one to choose. Apparently, competition is 
also a process of selection. In business, the third party is the customers. Fail-
ure to be selected means going out of business.  
Adam Smith has explained the operation of competitive markets in The 
Wealth of Nations.2 In the long run, the price after full competition would 
equal the long-term “natural price”, i.e., the cost of production. If, for example, 
apples’ market price is higher than the “natural price”, which means that there 
is a higher profit than the natural return, more resources will be invested into 
apple market, and the resulting increase in production will lead to a decrease 
in the market price. The resource owner will leave the market when apples’ 
market price equals to its “natural price”. The movement of resources from 
one market to another will stop only when natural prices prevail in all markets. 
At that point, customers can obtain goods at the lowest possible cost. This is an 
optimum allocation of resource.  
For a very long time, economists claimed that competitive markets did not 
need any government intervention because economic systems based on com-
petitive markets work much better than the alternatives. However, this stand 
has changed slightly following the Great Recession. History told us that the 
market cannot always be trusted to either inspire or preserve competition.3 
When competition is seriously jeopardized, consumers will pay. At that point, 
intervention from a "visible hand" might be needed, followed by a competition 
law to protect competition when the market fails to so.  
                                                          
1 See Phedon Nicolaides, An Essay on Economics and the Competition Law of the European Community, 
(2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, pp.11 
2 See eg. Adam Smith, the Wealth of Nation, (Bantam Classics; Reprint edition, March 4, 2003). 
3 See the Chapters of Market Failure in textbooks of microeconomics, eg. Michael Parkin, Microeconom-
ics, 11th ed. (Pearson Education, Inc.2010).  
Introduction 
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Defined literately, competition law (in the Unitied States (US), antitrust law) is 
a law to promote fair competition, and therefore to protect consumer welfare.  
“Antitrust laws in general …. are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as 
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise sys-
tem as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms.”4  
Competition law intervenes in the competition process when the market fails. 
However, the role of competition law in regulating the market is highly contro-
versial and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Protecting consumer wel-
fare has been treated as the main (or in some jurisdictions, the only) objective 
of competition law.5 Competition law condemns practices that harm the com-
petitive process, particularly anti-competitive agreements, abusive behaviours 
and mergers.  
1.1.2 The EU Competition Law System 
The European Union’s (the EU) competition law is based on Article 3(1)(b) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),6 which provides 
that EU has exclusive competence in “establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market” (in succession to the Arti-
cle 3(1)(g) TEC7 which authorizes the establishment of “a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted”). Apparently, the role of 
competition law in the EU is not limited to ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted. Instead, it undertakes to safeguard the com-
mon market.8  
The EU competition law system put in place by the TFEU is primarily con-
tained in Title VII, Chapter 1 (Articles 101-109), which indicates that the four 
policy areas, in which measures must be taken indicate to prevent anticom-
petitive activities, include the following: 
x Cartels, or control of collusion and other anti-competitive practices 
under Article 101 TFEU which prohibits all agreements and concerted 
practices between undertakings “which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, distortion or restriction of competition within the internal mar-
ket”. The cartel prohibition applies to the agreement between opera-
tors acting either at the same level (horizontal agreements) or at dif-
ferent levels (vertical agreements) of the economy. 
x Antitrust,9 or prevention of the abuse of a dominant market position 
under Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits “any abuse by one or more 
                                                          
4 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
5 See eg. Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law, (Cambridge University Press,2007), Richard Whish and 
David Bailey, Competition Law, 7ed (OUP Oxford; 12 Jan. 2012). 
6 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2008 C 115/47.  
7 The Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ C 325, 24 December 2002. 
8 For more information on the purpose of EU competition law, please refer to textbooks, eg. Alison Jones, 
Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, 3rd ed, (Oxford University Press, 2008).  
9 The term “antirust” has multiple meaning. It refers to the whole competition law system in the United 
States.  In the EU competition law system, it has two meanings. One refers to the infringements of Article 
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undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in 
a substantial part of it”. The dominant market position can be held ei-
ther individually by one undertaking or collectively by two or more 
undertakings (joint dominance). 
x Mergers, control of proposed mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures 
under the EC Merger Regulation (the ECMR) 10  which bans any 
merger which would “significantly impede effective competition in 
the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a re-
sult of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position”. Merger 
control examines the potential to creat or to strengthen a dominant 
market position. 
x State aid, i.e., control over EU Member States’ direct and indirect 
aid to companies under Articles 107 -109 TFEU. (For the purposes of 
this study, this policy area is not included in the term “competition 
law”.) 
Article 101 (cartel), Article 102 (antitrust) and the ECMR (merger) are often 
referred to as the “three pillars” of EU competition law. 
1.1.3 What is the Merger Remedy? 
Merger control in the EU is the procedure of reviewing mergers to decide 
whether they are compatible with the common market and, more precisely, 
whether they are acceptable under the ECMR. A merger with a Community 
dimension should be subject to exclusive scrutiny under the ECMR. The Euro-
pean Commission (the Commission) is the competition agency that enforces 
the competition rules at the EU level.  
“Effective competition brings benefits to consumers, such as low prices, high 
quality products, a wide selection of goods and services, and innovation. 
Through its control of mergers, the Commission prevents mergers that would be 
likely to deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the mar-
ket power of firms.”11  
Mergers will be permitted if the Commission finds that they “would not sig-
nificantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substan-
tial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position"12. The merger-review process has two phases: 
Phase I: Any concentration with a Community dimension shall be notified to 
the Commission before its implementation. Most phase I transactions obtain 
the Commission's approval either with or without conditions. In some cases, 
the Commission will be obliged to initiate phase II procedures based on seri-
ous doubts about their compatibility with the common market.  
                                                                                                                                                         
101 and 102 TFEU, the other is narrowed to those of Article 102 TFEU. To avoid confusions, in this arti-
cle, antitrust refers to the infringements of Article 101 TFEU. 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, at 1-22 
11 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Concentration between Undertakings (the EU Horizontal Merger Notice), 2004/C 31/03, OJ 2004 C 31/5, 
para. 8.  
12 ECMR, Article 2(2). 
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Phase II: At the end of a phase II investigation, the Commission will make a 
decision to either approve or prohibit the merger. As in phase I, an approval 
can be either conditional or unconditional.  
The Commission issues three types of final merger decisions: acceptance, 
prohibition and conditional clearance. Prohibition and conditional clearance 
decisions both indicate that a merger might significantly impact effective com-
petition. For a merger that might significantly impede effective competition, 
prohibition is not always the best choice, because although prohibition might 
prevent the potential damages to the competition, it may also prevent the pos-
sible competitive benefits provided by almost all mergers. In such cases, if the 
merging parties (the parties) make a commitment to restore competition that 
might otherwise be undermined, the competition agencies will approve. These 
types of commitments are known as merger remedies. The reason for prohibit-
ing a merger, instead of permitting it with conditions, is that either a) no 
remedies were able to restore the competition that would be significantly im-
pacted, or b) the remedies proposed were inadequate and therefore rejected by 
the Commission. This is true in most cases. In this sense, remedies offer an 
opportunity for a merger to go forward even when it creates competition con-
cerns.   
1.1.4 Antitrust Remedies 
Remedies may also be imposed for the infringement of Article 102 TFEU. To 
rectify unlawful behaviours in the area of antitrust, the Commission can re-
quire remedies and/or impose fines, and private parties may claim monetary 
damages. An antitrust remedy must aim “to bring the infringement effectively 
to an end”.13 In many cases, the Commission may achieve this purpose with a 
straightforward “cease and desist” order. In other cases, the Commission must 
take measures to avoid the recurrence of abusive practice in addition to merely 
enjoining a conduct and imposing a fine. Those additional measures are anti-
trust remedies. 
1.1.5 The Economics of Competition Law 
One distinctive feature of competition law is its deep roots in the science of 
economics, which provides a starting point for competition law’s analyses14 
and gives the law and its decisions a more solid, rational foundation.  
“While lawyers including judges are in control of prosecutorial choices and judi-
cial decisions … it is fair to say that, from a longer term perspective, decade-to-
decade, or era-to-era, antitrust has been shaped more importantly by the argu-
ments of economists.”15 
                                                          
13 Id, recital 12 and Article 7. 
14 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, An Economic Perspective, (the Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1976), at 
3.  
15 J. B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust,  in A. Cucinotta, R. Pardolesi and R. Van den Bergh 
(eds.) Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002)  at 68. 
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It is always useful to understand some basic concepts of economics that have 
been widely used in competition law, including competition, monopoly and 
dominance.  
 “Competition is inherently a process in which rivals seek to exclude one an-
other”.16 According to Adam Smith, rational businessmen driven by the profit 
motive will use their resource to achieve the highest value.17 They improve 
productive technology, enhance management, lower marginal costs, and en-
courage innovation. Taken together, these strategies not only provide consum-
ers with good deals, but also improve the welfare of the economy and society 
overall. The Microeconomics textbooks always describe the competition proc-
ess in terms of the perfect competition model, in which market price is decided 
by market supply and demand and no firm has any control over market 
prices.18 
A monopoly is the extreme opposite of competition and indicates the pres-
ence of only one seller in a market. Posner notes that monopolies are the basic 
concern of competition law.19 In particular, competition law addresses the is-
sue of dominance. Under the EU competition law, a dominance refers to “a 
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on a relevant market, by af-
fording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of consumers”. 20 
A firm enjoys a dominant position if it has significant market power.21 The 
assessment of dominance is also an appreciation of market power. The as-
sessment of market power is discussed in part 3.1.1.  
1.2 Research Aims 
1.2.1 The Significance of Merger Remedies 
 “For both empirical and theoretical reasons, ex post merger remedies are at 
least as important as ex ante rules and guidelines for the implementation of 
beneficial public policy regarding economic concentration of industry.”22  
                                                          
16 Robert Bork, the Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with itself, (New York: Free Press,1978), at 49.  
17 Smith (2003), supra note 2. 
18 See, eg. Parkin (2010), supra note 3. 
19 Posner (1976), supra note 14, at 3.  
20 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in ap-
plying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, p. 7–20, para 10.  See also, Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] 
ECR 461, para. 39. Dominance is  “such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does 
where there is a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not to 
determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will 
develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its 
detriment”. 
21 See eg. Robert O’Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, (Hart Pub-
lishing, 2006), Chapter 3.  
22 François Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, Introduction, in François Lévêque and Howard Shelanski 
(ed.), Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law, (Edward Elgar Pub, 2003) at 
xix.  
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Remedies are important in EU merger control because, empirically speaking, 
most competition-concerned mergers are cleared on the condition of reme-
dies.23 Merger remedies as a government intervention in the market have di-
rect effects once they have been implemented. On the one hand, remedies free 
merger decisions from a simple yes/no option and prevent the prohibition of 
mergers that have both pro- and anti-competitive effects. Using the remedy 
tool, competition authorities can expand the scope of merger control and regu-
late market behaviours on a finer level, e.g. they can accept a merger in one 
market and remove its competitive harm in another market by adopting reme-
dies.24 On the other hand, as a direct intervention in the market process, an 
impropriate remedy may lead to anti-competitive results. Choosing the right 
package of remedies for a competition concerned merger is not easy. There 
might be two types of errors in merger remedies: under-fixing and over-fixing.  
Accordingly, a deep examination on how to design appropriate merger 
remedies is warranted.  Since the EU and the US have released their guidance 
and empirical research on merger remedies, more competition law scholars 
have directed their attention to this topic. A few studies have discussed the 
post-merger effects of remedies and the principles of a good remedy. That 
notwithstanding, merger remedies receive much less academic attention than 
other merger-control issues. 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
This study analyses the Commission’s merger remedy practise in comparison 
with its practise under Article 102 TFEU, with the goal of developing a way to 
minimize errors in designing merger remedies. The study’s main focus is on 
the following major questions: 
(1) What is the merger remedies practise in the EU? 
(2) What is the relationshisp among various types of remedies and competi-
tion concerns under EU merger control? 
(3) What is the difference between the remedies adopted in the field of EU 
merger control and Article 102? And why? 
(4) How could the Commission improve its remedy practise?  
 
For this purpose, the articles included in this study examine the remedies 
adopted by the Commission, compare EU merger control practice with its 
counterpart in China, explain the extremely different positions of remedies in 
antitrust and merger control, and demonstrate that antitrust and merger con-
trol are inconsistent with each other because the former is too weak and the 
latter too strong.  
                                                          
23 From 1990 to the end of 2008, the Commission has made a total of 3,860 final merger decisions, in-
cluding 265 conditional clearances (177 Phase I and 88 Phase II decisions) and 20 prohibitions. Only 7% 
of competition-concerned mergers were blocked and others got carried out on condition that remedies 
were put into place. See, Wei Wang & Matti Rudanko, EU Merger Remedies and Competition Concerns: 
An Empirical Assessment, 18(4) European Law Journal 555 (2012), at 555. 
24 Patrick Ray, Economic Analysis and the Choice of Remedies, in François Lévêque and Howard She-
lanski (2003), supra note 22, at 130. 
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1.2.3 General Conclusion 
This study’s general conclusion is that the EU’s remedy practises under Article 
102 and the ECMR are inconsistent and merger remedies should be consid-
ered and designed under the EU competition law structure as a whole, not 
solely under merger control. 
1.3 Methodologies 
Essentially, this study is legal research. According to Aulis Aarnio, ordinary 
legal research includes the history of law, the sociology of law, comparative law 
and legal dogmatics.25 This dissertation used three methods: legal dogmatics, 
comparative law, and law and economics.  
1.3.1 Legal Dogmatics  
The primary method used in this study is legal dogmatics. Legal dogmatics is 
the traditional method of legal research. It does not have an unequivocal defi-
nition. The central task of legal dogmatics is to interpret and systematise legal 
norms. 26  Interpretation involves manufacturing knowledge by employing 
theories in law.27 Systematisation involves organising the norms under study 
into a coherent system.28 Systematisation is the theoretical aspect of legal 
dogmatics and interpretation is its practical aspect.29  
This study’s third and fourth article only use legal dogmatics to explain the 
differences in EU competition law practise related to antitrust and merger 
remedies and to determine how to harmonize that practice under the structure 
of EU competition law. 
1.3.2 Comparative Law 
Comparative law is the study of differences and similarities between the laws 
of various countries. Comparative law has been proven useful not only in fram-
ing domestic legislation with the assistance of foreign laws but also in inter-
preting national rules of law.30 Comparative law as a research method is suit-
able for a critical observation of various cases and countries’ legal norms and 
solutions related to similar legal issues. 
This study’s second article adopts the comparative law method to analyse the 
similarities and difference among the merger control policies (particularly the 
merger remedies) of China and the EU. 
                                                          
25 Aulis Aarnio, “Introduction by Aulis Aarnio”, in Aleksander Peczenik, Jaap Hage, On Law and Reason, 
(Springer Science & Business Media, Jan 12, 2014), at 2. 
26 Id, at 3. 
27 Aulis Aarnio, Essays on the Doctrinal Study of Law, (Springer Science & Business Media, 2011), at 183. 
28 Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), at 31 
29 Aulis Aarnio (2014), supra note 25, at 3. 
30 Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative law, (CLARENDON PRESS; OXFORD 
University Press, 3 ed, 1998), at 16-21.  
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1.3.3 Law and Economics 
The methodology of law and economics is “the application of economic theory 
and econometric methods to examine the formation, structure, processes and 
impact of law and legal institutions the economic analysis of law”.31 Economics 
provided a theoretic tool for lawyers to predict and evaluate how the law will 
affect behaviour. Based on neoclassic economic theories, law and economics 
assumes not only that law-breakers are rational calculators that view legal 
sanctions as implicit prices for certain types of behaviour, but also that these 
prices can be set to guide behaviours in a socially desirable direction.32  
Law and economics has two subfields: positive analysis and normative analy-
sis. Positive law and economics predict how individuals will act when subject 
to a given rule by using simplified economics models.33 Normative analysis 
asks how the law can be improved to better achieve the goal of efficiency.34 
Law and economics claims that efficiency is a goal that the law should reflect, 
and that legal rules should be changed when they fail to achieve that effi-
ciency.35 
This study primarily uses law and economics methods in two ways. First, it 
creates an economic model to explain how to assess market power (Chapter 
3.1.1 of the Summary). Second, the analyses in this dissertation, including both 
the summary and and articles, use economic theories and models to interpre-
tate and systematise legal norms, eg., the classification of merger remedies, the 
purposes of merger remedies and the appropriateness of remedies.  In other 
words, the law and economics approach is applied along with legal dogmatics.  
1.4 Articles Included in This Study 
This study includes four articles and a summary. The four articles are listed as 
follows: 
1)  Wei Wang & Matti Rudanko, EU Merger Remedies and Competition Con-
cerns: An Empirical Assessment, European Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue. 4, July 
2012, pp. 555–576. 
Abstract: The purpose of merger remedies is to relieve the potential com-
petitive detriments as to preserve the efficiencies. The European Community 
(EC) Merger Remedies Notice requires remedies able to remove the identified 
competition concerns entirely and proportionately. The scope of each merger 
remedy package is confined by the competition concern in question. This study 
analyses, from an empirical point of view, the relationship between competi-
tion concerns and merger remedies. It reviews all remedies accepted in Phase 
II EU merger investigation and categorises them into seven sets according to 
their nature. Results of the empirical assessment present the frequencies of 
                                                          
31 MacKaay, E, “History of Law and Economics”, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. 1, (Chelten-
ham, UK:Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000) ,at 65, available at: http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0200book.pdf.  
32 Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to law, (Stanford University Press, 2004) at 1. 
33 Alan Devlin, Principles of law and economics, (Routledge, 2015), at 2.  
34 Thomas J. Miceli (2004), supra note 32, at 2. 
35 Id, at 3.  
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each remedy type accepted for resolving various competitions concerns and 
reveal that merger remedy design does vary for different competition con-
cerns. Horizontal effects require divestiture remedies more. Other structural 
remedies, especially access commitment and supply commitment, have a good 
chance to be accepted in resolving vertical and conglomerate effects. 
 
2) Wei Wang & Lei Wang, Merger Control and Merger Remedies in China: 
Comparison with the EU Approach, Journal of Business Law, Issue 6, 2014, 
449-466  
Abstract: This Article reveals how the abstract foreign concepts are embed-
ded in the Chinese merger control regime and the imported analytical tech-
niques has been applied in practise through comparing the merger control 
practice in the European Union and China, with particular focus on merger 
remedies. 
 
3) Wei Wang, Compulsory Licensing as Antitrust and Merger Remedy in EU, 
(unpublished) 
Abstract: The European Commission adopted compulsory licensing as 
remedy in both antitrust and merger cases, but the accepting criteria and de-
sign of compulsory licenses varied. In merger cases, compulsory licensing is 
often adopted as a supplementary or alternative to divestitures with favourable 
terms for licensees, while in antitrust cases, compulsory licensing is rare and 
controversial. Recently, the application of compulsory licensing to high-tech 
markets attracts more criticism and studies towards compulsory licensing. It is 
worth rethinking about compulsory licensing as a competition remedy in the 
context of high-tech. The focus of this article is on compulsory licensing under 
Article 102 TFEU and merger control in EU. It elaborates the EU practise of 
compulsory licensing in antitrust and merger cases, explains the differences 
between competition licensing adopted under Article 102 and merger control, 
and claims that application of compulsory licensing under antitrust and 
merger control should be consistent and the experience gained in one policy 
area may be shared with and help reaching better remedies in the other. 
 
4) Wei Wang, Structural Remedies in EU Antitrust and Merger Control, 
World Competition 34, no. 4 (2011): 571–596. 
Abstract: In both antitrust and merger cases, remedies serve the same pur-
pose, namely to stop the infringement of competition and restore competition. 
However, the practice of remedy policy in these two areas is varied, for exam-
ple, structural remedies are preferred in merger cases but strictly limited in 
antitrust. This article analyses the extremely different positions of structural 
remedies in antitrust and merger control. It also reviews the facts and reme-
dies of the E.ON Electricity case, the first antitrust decision with structural 
remedies adopted or imposed by the European Commission. It argues that EU 
competition law is not a coherent system for while antitrust enforcement is too 
weak, merger control is too strong. Furthermore, this article argues that the 
deterrent power of Article 102 should be reinforced to increase its weight in 
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fighting unilateral anticompetitive behaviours, but merger control should 
show more tolerance to the efficiency-enhanced mergers. 
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2. EU Merger Remedies  
2.1 The Purpose of EU Merger Remedies 
Merger remedies are adopted to prevent and resolve the potential harms to 
market competition created by a merger.36 They free merger decisions from 
being limited to a simple yes/no option and prevent the prohibition of mergers 
with both pro- and anti-competitive effects. The remedy tool enables competi-
tion authorities both to extend the scope of merger control and to regulate 
market behaviours on a finer level, e.g., they can accept a merger in one mar-
ket and refuse it in another market, reallocate assets in a questionable market 
by divestiture, or influence market price with a supply guarantee.37 “Through 
remedies we seek to restore or maintain competition while permitting the re-
alisation of relevant merger efficiencies and other benefits.”38  
Any decision about merger remedies must follow a confirmation of the com-
petitive harms that are expected to arise from a merger transaction. The 
Commission has no power to impose any remedy on the merging parties on a 
unilateral basis. The Commission cannot rewrite the notified operation on its 
own initiative. It can only impose remedies on the notified operation once the 
parties have proposed such changes themselves. Accordingly, merger remedies 
are agreements about the line between the harmless and harmful parts of a 
merger. The Commission should assess its effectiveness and necessity of each 
merger based on the facts and circumstances of individual cases.39 
2.2 Principles of Acceptable Merger Remedies 
According to Balto, the choice of remedy has three objectives: first, to deter-
mine which remedies will effectively and fully preserve competition, second, to 
select a remedy that will preserve competition with as much certainty as possi-
ble, and third, to preserve the efficiency-enhancing potential of a merger, to 
the extent that is possible without compromising the obligation to preserve 
                                                          
36 Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and un-
der Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, (The EU Merger Remedies Notice), OJ 2008/C 267/1, 
para. 2.  
37 Patrick Rey, (2003), supra note 24, at 129. 
38 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, MERGER REMEIDES REVIEW PRO-
JECT Report for the fourth ICN annual conference Bonn, (June 2005), at 3, available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.  
39 See OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, OECD Policy Roundtables, 
DAF/COMP(2006)19 (15 May 2007), at 187, available at  
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/38623413.pdf, 28 Mar. 2015. 
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competition.40 This is consistent with the guiding principles of competition 
remedies in the EU, i.e., effectiveness, proportionality and legal certainty.41 
2.2.1 Effectiveness 
An appropriate merger remedy must be able to effectively preserve competi-
tion. As Justice Brennan recognized in DuPont case: “the key to the whole 
question of an antitrust remedy is of course the discovery of measures effective 
preserve competition.”42 If there is no remedy available that can effectively 
eliminate competition problems, the Commission has no choice but to block 
the merger.  
Elements of Effectiveness 
The EU Merger Remedies Notice does not elaborate the elements of the effec-
tiveness of acceptable remedies. However, it does provide some basic condi-
tions, which largely overlap with the four distinct dimensions of the effective-
ness of a remedy given in the Merger Remedy Review Project Report of the 
International Competition Network (ICN):43  
(1) “Comprehensive impact. The remedy should seek to deal with all the 
competitive detriments expected from the merger.” 
    The Commission requires remedies to be “comprehensive and ef-
fective from all points of view”.44 
(2)  “Acceptable risk. The eventual impact of any remedy is, to some ex-
tent, uncertain. Competition authorities will seek to implement effec-
tive remedies that generally have low levels of risk of not adequately 
addressing competitive detriments. This is particularly important 
where a competition authority is restricted in its ability to modify a 
remedy in the event of it failing to perform as anticipated.”  
    The Commission indicates that the requisite degree of certainty is 
an element of the assessment of the effectiveness of a remedy. It 
should be possible to implement an acceptable remedy and the new 
commercial structures resulting from it will be sufficiently workable 
and lasting to ensure that no significant impediment to effective 
competition will materialize.45 
(3) “Practicality. An effective remedy should be capable of practical im-
plementation, monitoring and enforcement within the jurisdiction of 
the relevant competition authority. This will also imply that the im-
plementation and operation of the remedy should be clearly ex-
pressed.”  
                                                          
40  See, Richard Parker & David Balto, The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies, (2000), available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2000/05/evolving-approach-merger-remedies. 
41 See, Alexander Italianer, Legal certainty, proportionality, effectiveness: the Commission's practice on 
remedies, Brussels Charles River Associates Annual Conference (05 Dec, 2012). 
42 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, (1961) at 326. 
43 ICN Merger Working Group (2005), Supra note 38, para 2.5 
44 EU Merger Remedies Notice, supra note 36, para 9.  
45 Id, para 11. 
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    The Commission emphasises practical implementation and the 
ability to monitor the remedy, particularly for the non-divestiture 
remedies.46  
(4) “Appropriate duration and timing. It is desirable or remedies to ad-
dress the competitive detriments effectively over their expected dura-
tion. Remedies that act quickly in addressing competitive concerns 
are preferable to remedies that are expected to have an effect only in 
the longer term or where the timing of the effect is uncertain.”  
    This point is also shared by the Commission. It expects the remedy 
to be capable of being effective implementation within a short period 
of time because competitive conditions will not be maintained until 
the remedy is fulfilled.47 
Assessment of Effectiveness 
To be effective, remedies are supposed to maintain effective market competi-
tion. What should be used as the benchmark of the effective competition? 
Competition at pre-merger levels is mostly used by competition agencies.48 A 
rigorous assessment of the effectiveness of remedies requires a close examina-
tion of each case taking into account various scenarios either with alternative 
remedies or without any remedy at all. Of course, during merger review, the 
available information is so poor that it is almost impossible to perform such an 
assessment. Therefore, the pre-merger competition can be a reasonable 
benchmark, although not an optimal one, for assessing the effectiveness of 
remedies. 
All of the relevant factors relating to the proposed remedy will be taken into 
consideration for assessing its effectiveness, including, inter alia, the type, 
scale and scope of the remedy proposed, judged by reference to the structure 
and particular characteristics of the market in which the competition concerns 
arise, including the position of the parties and other players on the market.49 
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) also indicates that the remedy should not 
only be tailored to the violation but also flow from the theory or theories of 
competitive harm.50 
2.2.2   Proportionality 
The objective of the EU merger remedies’ objective is to eliminate competition 
concerns, but the scope of those remedies is not explicitly provided. Instead, 
the ECMR introduces the principle of proportionality to merger design which 
requires the remedies both to be proportional to the competition problem and 
to completely eliminate it.51  
                                                          
46 Id, para 13. 
47 Id, para 9. 
48 OECD, 'Merger remedies', round table series, DAF/COMP (2004) 21, At 7. 
49 EU Merger Remedies Notice, Supra note 36, para 12. 
50 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011), at 4.  
51 ECMR, para. 30. 
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The principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of EU law. It 
constitutes an important limit to the use of the EU’s power, including the 
Commission’s discretion in providing merger remedies. Article 5(4) of TFEU 
provides that “under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of 
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties”. According to settled case law, the principle of proportionality the 
following: (1) that the measures adopted by EU institutions should not exceed 
the limits that are appropriate and necessary to attain the legitimate objective 
pursued;52 (2) when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, 
recourse must be made to the least onerous; and (3) the disadvantages caused 
must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.53  
In the context of a merger remedy, the principle of proportionality requires a 
close fit among the competition concern, the remedies available to the Com-
mission and a balance between competing values. This principle emphasizes 
the remedy’s ability to eliminate the competition problem in light of the rem-
edy’s size, degree, or intensity in relation to that problem.54 A desirable remedy 
should adequately address the competition problem without unnecessarily 
restricting firms’ freedom to seek efficiencies and profitable opportunities.55 If 
a remedy is proportional to the underlying competition concern, the remedial 
restrictions placed on the parties will not exceed the efficiency gains 
achieved.56  
“As to proportionality, the Commission has made it clear that a remedy cannot 
be made binding if it does not adequately address competition concerns. Also, if 
equally effective, the Commission will prefer the less burdensome remedy for 
companies.”57 
Although the Commission should evaluate the proportionality of merger 
remedies, the scope of its proportionality assessment is unclear. The ECJ has 
indicated in the 2010 Alrosa Appeal that within the field of EU competition 
law, the application of the principle of proportionality may not always be uni-
form.58  The Alrosa Appeal addressed the application of Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003. The case confirms the obligation on that the Commission’s obligation 
to ensure that the principle of proportionality is observed may have a different 
scope and content based on the characteristics of the mechanisms involved 
and actions available under the various competition law provisions.59 Under 
Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission must impose remedies “which 
                                                          
52 See, Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland [1984] ECR 2171, para 25, Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods 
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53 See, Case 265/87 Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, para 21; Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] 
ECR I-4023, para 13; Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] 
ECR I-4863, para 41; and Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, para 81. 
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tionality, 48(2) the Antitrust Bulletin, 377 (2003 Summer), at 414. 
55 Bruce Lyons & Andrei Medvedev, Bargaining over Remedies in Merger Regulation, CCP working Paper 
07-3, 2 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970250, accessed on 28 March 2011. 
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are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the 
infringement effectively to an end”,60 but under Article 9, the Commission’s 
obligation in relation to the principle of proportionality “is confined to verify-
ing that the commitments in question address the concerns it expressed to the 
undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less onerous commit-
ments that also address those concerns adequately”.61  
The Alrosa Appeal did not give direct instruction about how to assess the 
proportionality of a merger remedy. However, the ECJ indicates that if the 
Commission if the Commission is not legally required to make a finding of 
infringement and the remedies are offered by the undertakings concerned, 
then the Commission could enjoy wide discretion with respect to the principle 
of proportionality.62  
2.2.3   Legal Certainty 
Legal certainty is one of the general principles of EU law. According to settled 
case law, the principle of legal certainty requires that “rules of law be clear, 
precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have 
negative consequences on individuals and undertakings”.63  
Legal certainty is connected to transparency and consistency. Transparency 
implies that the policies and major issues of accepting merger remedies in 
each case should be “clear, obvious and understandable without doubt or am-
biguity”.64 It concerns access to documents, knowledge of who made the deci-
sions and how they are made, simplification of the legal process, consultation, 
a duty to give reasons and other issues.65 Consistency is a major method of 
maintaining predictability, which in turn facilitates the realisation of legal cer-
tainty. 66  The Commission is required to act consistently when accepting 
merger remedies to provide a reliable basis for corporate decisions and expec-
tations.67 
Legal certainty is important so that business can know the legal framework 
within which it operates. The Commission sets useful precedents for merger 
remedies so that merging parties will know the types of remedies that are 
likely to be accepted in the future.68 Legal certainty in merger remedy practice 
may reduce legal risk and facilitate business investment not only by telling 
merging parties that their plan may be carried on with proper remedy proposal 
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but also assuring other market players that competition will either remain un-
distorted or be restored. 
2.3 Classification of Merger Remedies 
The most common classification of merger remedies is the struc-
tural/behavioural distinction.69 Definitions of this distinction can be found in 
both competition authorities’ documents and academic articles. However, this 
distinction is not as lucid as it sounds.  
Sullivan gives his interpretation of this distinction as follows:  
“Structural remedies change the structure of the market at issue. This is 
achieved by divestiture, which severs a business or business share from the 
company under scrutiny, and  
Behavioural remedies control the conduct of the merging entities or the domi-
nant firm without disrupting the market structure.” 70  
Here, “structure” is understood as market structure and “behaviour” or 
“conduct” refers to the merged firm’. Structural remedies change market struc-
ture, but behavioural remedies do not. All agree that changes to market struc-
ture are primarily achieved by sales of physical assets, which might cause con-
fusion. According to the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm of 
traditional industrial organisation economics, market structure determines 
business conduct and performance in industrial economics; conversely, busi-
ness conduct and performance may affect market structure indirectly.71  Basi-
cally, marketers affect each other with their conducts all of which eventually 
has an impact on market structure. Take remedies as an example, compulsory 
licensing a key patent to potential competitors lowers barriers to entry, 
whereas a price cap will shape the market-price curve (more or less) in the 
short or long run. Thus, a remedy other than divestiture can also alter market 
structure.  
The definitions provided by the ICN Merger Remedies Review avoid this 
confusion by confining the definition of structural remedies to those remedies 
that have a direct impact on market structure.  
 “Structural remedy: remedy that addresses the competitive detriment of a 
merger though direct intervention in the structure of the market. 
Behavioural remedy: remedy that addresses the competitive detriment of a 
merger by changing the behaviour of the merger parties or others”72 
The 2004 US Merger Remedies Guide once distinguished structural and be-
havioural remedies as follows: “one addresses the structure of the market, the 
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70 Sullivan (2003), Supra note 54, at 396. 
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other the conduct of the merged firm”. 73  However, this statement was re-
moved from the 2011 revision. It is worth noting that the 2011 US Merger 
Remedies Guide signals an expansive approach to behavioural remedies in 
merger cases.74  
Motta, Polo and Vasconcelos classify merger remedies in a slightly different 
ways.  
"Structural remedies modify the allocation of property rights and create new 
firms: they include divestiture of an entire ongoing business, or partial divesti-
ture (possibly a mix and match of assets and activities of the different firms in-
volved in the merger project). 
Non-structural remedies set constraints on the property rights: they might con-
sist of engagements by the merging parties not to abuse certain assets available 
to them. They might also consist of contractual arrangements such as compul-
sory licensing or access to intellectual property. "75 
This definition avoids explaining “structure” and introduces property rights 
as a benchmark that draws a clear line between two types of remedies. Patrick 
Rey also emphasizes the effects that a remedy has on asset by noting “behav-
ioural remedies often tend to promote asset sharing, whereas divestitures in-
sist more on asset transfers.”76 
Despite the above sources’ different interpretation of the distinction, all of 
them agree that divestiture is the major structural remedy, and that solutions 
related to post-merger business conduct are behavioural remedies. However,  
some remedies, such as those involving access to intellectual property rights, 
are particularly difficult to categorise.77 
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Figure 1. Overview of the merger remedies universe (The ICN Merger Remedies Review)78 
 
The Remedies Notice does not define structural and behavioural remedies. 
Instead, it vaguely refers to structural remedies as "commitments which are 
structural in nature"79 and to behavioural remedies as other types of solutions,. 
It sorts remedies into three types:80  
1) Divestiture; 
2) Other structural remedies, such as granting access to key infrastruc-
ture or inputs and changing existing long-term contracts; and  
3) Commitments related to the future behaviour of the merged entity, 
such as undertaking not to raise prices, to reduce product ranges or 
remove brands.  
The Remdies Notice clearly provides that structural remedies include not 
just divestiture but also other remedies which are “equivalent in its effects to a 
divestiture”.81 Conversely, behavioural remedies have a narrow scope and can 
be accepted only in exceptional cases.  
The first article in this study applies a different classification of remedies.  
1 Commitments to transfer a 
business (transfer remedies)  
requiring the merging entities to sell part of their business to 
suitable purchasers in the overlapping markets.  
2 Commitments to exit from a 
joint venture (exit remedies)  
requiring the merging entities to sell their shares or stakes in a 
joint venture which would lead to their exit from the joint venture.  
3 Commitments to limit share-
holding (shareholding reme-
dies)  
aiming to restrain the merging entities from fully exercising their 
shareholder's rights in some joint ventures.  
4 Commitments to grant access 
(access remedies)  
requiring the merging entities to offer competitors or buyers of 
the divested business access to intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) or infrastructure on a non-discriminatory or favourite 
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basis.  
5 Commitments to change 
supply relationships (supply 
remedies)  
urging the merging entities to enter into, alter or terminate sup-
ply contracts for the benefit of competitors or customers.  
6 Commitments to be abstained 
from certain conducts (ab-
stention remedies)  
prohibiting the merging entities from specific conduct that are 
established to have negative effects on competition.  
7 Other commitments these remedies cannot be categorized into any type listed 
above.  
Table 1. Categories of merger remedies82 
The first article in this study, EU Merger Remedies and Competition Con-
cerns: An Empirical Assessment, reports empirical research to reveal the rela-
tionship between competition concerns and merger remedies. The results 
show that horizontal effects are more likely to require structural remedies, 
such as transfer commitments and exit commitments, whereas vertical effects 
are more behavioural remedies, such as supply commitments and access 
commitments. 
2.4 The Costs of Merger Remedies 
The great advantage of merger remedies is that they allow the realisation of 
some of a merger’s potentially competitive benefits, which would otherwise be 
lost in the event of a prohibition decision. However, conditional clearance of 
mergers always comes at a price. The acceptable merger remedies accepted for 
competition concerns may create various costs. The International Competition 
Network listed issued a report that listed and explained three types of potential 
costs imposed by merger remedies:83  
1) Remedy operating costs, or direct costs.  
Operating costs exist at the design, monitoring and enforcement stages. At 
the design stage, competition agencies may need to seek more information to 
devise a proportionate remedy in a short period of time. At the monitoring and 
enforcement stages, costs are typically linked to medium or long-term moni-
toring and implementation measures related to behavioural remedies, e.g., 
employing trustees, collecting monitoring information, etc..  
2) Remedy impact costs, or indirect costs 
Impact costs may arise if a remedy distorts competition. This is more likely 
to be the case with behavioural remedies in which potential pro-competitive 
activities may be restrained or inefficiencies may be generated. For example, 
when an abstention remedy is imposed, the merged firm may devote addi-
tional efforts to avoiding violating the remedy’s provision, regardless of 
whether its activities are pro- or anti-competitive. Price maintenance might 
create inefficiency by discouraging investment. 
3) Merger efficiencies or other benefits foregone.  
The choice and design of merger remedies are a competition agecy’s proc-
esses of defining and prioritizing a merger’s efficiencies and other competitive 
benefits. Generally, a merger’s expected efficiencies are only likely to be con-
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sidered relevant if they are expected to result in significant benefits to custom-
ers.84 Other benefits might be neglected. Moreover, the ex-ante assessment of 
remedies involves risk and uncertainty. Because of the limited information at 
the time a remedy is designed, a competition agency may be unable to fully 
understand the relavant industry’s business model. Subsequently, the de-
signed remedy may result in either under-, or over-fixing. If a decision turns 
out to be wrong or a market situation changes, the remedies adopted may have 
negative effects on efficiency. It is possible to adjust behavioural remedies to 
the changing circumstances, but a structural remedy’s impact on the con-
cerned firm is irreversible. 
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3. Merger Remedies and Competitive Con-
cerns in EU Merger Review 
The substantive test under the ECMR is that a merger will be blocked if it 
would “significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in 
a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position”.85 The test is based on the evaluation of market condi-
tions beyond market concentration that affect the likelihood that a proposed 
merger will have adverse effects on competition.86 Competition concerns are 
raised only when potential impediments to competition are caused or 
strengthened by a merger. There must be causal links between mergers and 
potential harms to competition. If, for example, one of the parties has already 
been or will be in a dominant position even without a merger, the merger will 
not trigger competition concerns because it does not cause or facilitate any 
effect on competition.   
Different competition concerns may arise in different types of mergers. Hori-
zontal mergers eliminate competitors and vertical mergers unite buyers and 
sellers. Conglomerate mergers bring smaller (but not absent) effects on market 
structure.87 These changes (more or less) alter either competition structure or 
efficiency. Corresponding to merger types, competition concerns can be classi-
fied into three types, i.e., horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects. Hori-
zontal effect is the most common and complicated of the three effects. It has 
two main subtypes: non-coordinated effects and coordinated effects. The fol-
lowing parts will discuss those competition effects.  
3.1 Horizontal Effects: Non-coordinated Effects 
One direct result of a horizontal merger is the convergence of all rof the parties’ 
resources into a single firm. The merged firm possesses all of the market 
power that the parties once owned separately. A horizontal merger may have 
non-coordinated effects “by eliminating important competitive constraints on 
one or more firms, which consequently would have increased market power, 
without resorting to coordinated behaviour.”88  
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3.1.1 Assessment of Market Power 
Market power refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms) to profitably 
raise prices above the competitive level over a period of time, or to behave 
analogously by, e.g., either reducing output or limiting consumer choice.89 The 
firm with siginificant market power enjoys a dominant position.  
The Lerner index was first developed by Abba Lerner90 to measure market 
power. Because the economic definition of market power is the firm's ability to 
maintain prices above competitive levels, the Lerner index proposes to measure 
market power directly by a firm's margin, i.e., the ratio of profit over price, as 
in equation (1)  
                     m
m
P
CPL                                 (1)             
where L  denotes market power, mP  denotes the price of the firm and C  is 
the marginal cost. 
Landes and Posner note that in practice it is difficult to calculate marginal 
cost, so market power cannot be measured in equation (1).  They develop the 
Lerner index into another form by combining the firm’s market share with 
other factors such as market elasticity of demand, 91 
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where is  is the firm’s market share, DH  is the market elasticity of demand 
and jH  is the elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe.  
Landes and Posner provide an economic rationale for inferring market 
power from three market characteristics and indicate that a firm’s market 
power increases with its market share and decreases with market demand 
elasticity and fringe supply elasticity.  
(1) Market share: higher market shares and smaller demand elasticity re-
flect higher market power. 
(2) Market demand elasticity: a high market elasticity of demand implies 
that there are good substitutes in the market for the firm’s product, 
so the firm’s market power can be limited.  
(3) Fringe supply elasticity: a high fringe supply elasticity implies that 
fringe competitors can sharply increase their output when price in-
creases slightly, so a firm cannot earn profit solely by raising its 
prices.  
Of course, a real market structure includes much more complicated elements 
than the factors in this formula, including market dynamic and multimarket 
dominance. Some scholars have noted that this formulation is not accurate.92 
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As a fact, this formula cannot apply directly in competition cases to assess 
market power. However, it still presents some insight into how to measure 
market power and its implications are applicable in the practise of merger con-
trol.  
According to the Commission, an Article 102 marekt-power assessment 
should take into account the competitive structure of the market, particularly 
the following three factors: 
Ā— constraints imposed by the existing supplies from, and the position on the 
market of, actual competitors (the market position of the dominant under-
taking and its competitors), 
— constraints imposed by the credible threat of future expansion by actual com-
petitors or entry by potential competitors (expansion and entry), 
— constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the undertaking's customers 
(countervailing buyer power).ā93 
 In the context of merger review, the EU Horizontal Merger Notice lists a 
number of factors that may “influence whether significant non-coordinated 
effects are likely to result from a merger”. 94 The Commission indicates that 
none of these factors is necessarily decisive and that this list is not exhaustive. 
The foregoing parts discuss the factors listed in the EU Horizontal Merger No-
tice that are necessary to consider when assessing market power.  
3.1.2 Merging Firms Have Large Market Shares 
Market share may be a clear indicator of market power. The formula proposed 
by Landes and Posner suggests that market share, together with other market 
characteristics, may reflect market power. The greater the firm's market share, 
the less likely that other firms will be able to expand production to defeat a 
unilateral price increase. As a general rule, a significant market share is neces-
sary for a firm to have the ability to exercise unilateral market power.95 The 
imperfect connection between market share and market power has also been 
recognised. Landes and Posner note that the mechanical use of market share 
data alone to measure market power is misleading if it disregards market de-
mands and supply elasticities.96 Werden claims that market shares “are just 
descriptive statistics for an industry, intended to describe usefully the relative 
sizes of competitors in the relevant market”97 and “never come close to telling 
the whole market power story”.98  
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Like its US counterpart, the Commission has recognised market share and 
concentration levels as “useful first indication of the market structure and of 
the competitive importance”.99 “Although the importance of market shares 
may vary from one market to another, very large shares are in themselves, and 
save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant 
position”.100 
A standard procedure for evaluating market power always starts by comput-
ing market share, which is identified for each merging party, then summed up 
for the merged firm. Market share can be calculated in terms of, inter alia,  
value or volume.  
The EC case law has established that "very large market shares – 50% or 
more – may in themselves be evidence of the existence of a dominant market 
position"101. Here, a 50% or more market share could be considered particu-
larly high, but this finding is not strictly necessary to define a dominant posi-
tion. Several other factors need to be taken into account. In some cases, the 
Commission raised concerns even though the post-merger market shares 
might not exceed 40%.102 In general, the Commission presumes that a merger 
that results in a market share of less than 25% will not be harmful to the com-
mon market.103  
3.1.3 Merging Firms are Close Competitors 
Close competitors offer similar products. Product differentiation is a source of 
market power. When there is high degree of substitutability between the prod-
ucts of the merging firms and those of its rivals, it is less likely that the merger 
will significantly jeopardize effective competition.104 If a merger is between 
firms that produce the only two substitutable products of a particular type, 
non-coordinated effects would be more likely to occur because the merger 
would significantly reduce the degree of product differentiation, thus increas-
ing the parties’ market power. For example, one reason to block Volvo / 
Scania105 is that they are close competitors. 
Market demand elasticity may indicate whether a firm’s products have close 
substitutes. A high market elasticity of demand implies that there are good 
substitutes for a firm’s product of the firm in the market, so the firm cannot 
raise its price without losing significant sales. Demand elasticity may show 
whether it is possible for the merged firm to obtain extra profit by individually 
increasing prices or decreasing output because it has differentiated products. 
The method of measuring demand elasticity involves capturing customers’ 
reactions to a price increase. Assuming that a company increase its prices, if 
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there are many competitors in the same market, buyers will switch to other 
companies whose same or similar product has a lower price, and if the com-
pany has a monopoly or very little competition, it will not lose many buyers 
because customers have few alternatives. The magnitude of customer reaction 
to changes in price is measured by the own-price elasticity of demand, “which 
equals the percentage change in a firm’s sales that results from a 1 percent 
change in price.”106 
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where xK denotes the own-price elasticity of demand experienced by firm X, 
xQ denotes the quantity sold by firm X, and xP denotes the price. 
In practice, demand elasticity is difficult to calculate because of insufficient 
market data. The Commission may need to consider others factors that can 
show product differentiation among the product of the merged firm and those 
of its competitors and those of the parties.  
“Substitutability is a question of degree. In assessing the competitive constraint 
imposed by rivals, it must therefore be taken into account what is the substitut-
ability of their products with those offered by the allegedly dominant undertak-
ing.”107 
3.1.4 Customers Have Limited Possibilities of Switching Supplier 
The possibility of switching suppliers gives customers bargaining power for a 
competitive price. If this switching possibility is very small, it will cause mar-
ket demand elasticity to be low, and, the few suppliers may charge higher 
prices without worrying about losing customers. There are two factors used to 
determine customers’ options: the availability of alternatives and switching 
costs108.  
The availability of an alternative supply is very important for price bargain-
ing. If there are few or no alternative, customers are vulnerable to price in-
creases. The Commission has noted in VIAG / Continental Can that customers 
use dual- or multiple-sources to play suppliers against each another. 109  A 
merger might significantly weaken customers who have used dual sourcing 
from the two merging firms.110  
Sometimes even if there is another product available, customers must accept 
the price increase because of the cost of changing supplier. Switching costs 
occur when consumers decide to change supplier. For instance, the consumers 
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of printers will continue to buy the same brand of cartridges after they choose 
their printers because if they want to change cartridge suppliers, they have to 
buy new printers. Switching costs can be learning, transactional, contractual or 
psychological costs.111 They may serve as a barrier to prevent customers from 
changing suppliers, which in turn, enables producers to charge higher prices to 
existing customers. In Agfa Gevaert / Dupont, the supplier provided a “pack-
age deal” to end-users in which it agreed to provide equipment free of charge 
or on favourable conditions, and the customer agreed to purchase consum-
ables from the equipment supplier for a period of time, generally two to three 
years, with the cost of the equipment assimilated into the prices charged for 
the consumables,112 The Commission identified that “package deal” as a barrier 
to switching for end-users.113 
The presence of a switching cost gives firms more incentives to attract new 
consumers, because, once consumers are locked in, a higher price can be 
charged. To attract new consumers, suppliers are willing to give all or part of 
their ex post rent to consumers, for example, by providing new consumers 
with a special discount. This practice drives intensified ex ante competition. 
Switching costs themselves might change the competition structure, but they 
do not cause competitive problems. However, in combination with other fac-
tors, such as scale economies, switching costs can be a cause for competition 
concerns.114 
3.1.5 Competitors Are Unlikely to Increase Supply if Prices Increase 
The final factor determining market power, as indicated by Landes and Posner, 
is fringe supply elasticity. High fringe supply elasticity implies that fringe 
competitors can increase large output when market price increases slightly, so 
the merged firm cannot profit solely by raising prices. The increasing output 
may come from either existing competitors or potential new incomers. Let us 
take a simple example. There are two firms in a market: a dominant Firm A 
with an 80% market share, and a fringe Firm B with a 20% market. Firm A 
would like to increase market price, so it just cut down its output. Naturally, 
market price would increase after this supply decrease. However, whether this 
price increase can last depends on Firm B’s reaction. If Firm B can increase its 
supply to meet market demand, market price will decrease and Firm A will 
lose market share. In the other case, if Firm B cannot increase its supply be-
cause of, e.g., capacity constraints or limited resources, the market price will 
remain higher and Firm A will not lose market share. Once a firm’s drop in 
output can be supplemented by other competitors, the total supply will not 
decrease, andthen, market price will not increase. In this sense, non-
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coordinated effects are less likely if other rivals can expand their production in 
a timely fashion.  
The competitors’ incapability of to substantially increase their supply might 
encourage a merged entity to reduce its output. This failure to expand produc-
tion can result from either capacity constraints or costly expansion.115  The 
Commission has also noted that rivals’ capacity is a more important factor in 
homogenous-product cases than in differentiated-product ones.116 In CVC / 
Lenzing, the Commission examined the historical capacity of European VSF 
producers and found that Lenzing is the only one that "actually raised its pro-
duction capacity, against the common trend of capacity reductions"117. Because 
the company’s other rivals were less likely to increase their capacity for a price 
increase, the merging entities "would control a substantial share of total capac-
ity and have an incentive to create shortage of supply in order to keep prices 
high"118. 
3.1.6 Merged Entity Able to Hinder Expansion by Competitors 
In light of the discussion above about rivals' capacity to be a factor that coun-
teracts non-coordinated effects, a firm with unilateral market power might 
have an intention to hinder either the expansion of its competitors or the entry 
of new ones. A merged entity may have the ability to hinder rivals' expansion 
because it controls some necessary resources for expansion, such as the supply 
of input, intellectual property, or access to infrastructure or platforms.119 These 
controls are more related to vertical relationships, which are discussed in de-
tail in part 2.3. 
The ability to hinder competitiors’ expansion may also emanate from the 
dominant firm’s greater efficiency than its rivals. A dominant firm’s cost ad-
vantages of enable it to produce the same products at a lower cost and to sell 
them at a lower price than its competitors. This low-price strategy can be used 
either to squeeze competitors out of the market or to limit them to a very small 
fraction of the market. A dominant position might be supported by cost advan-
tages. It is necessary for a dominant firm to maintain prices at a competitively 
low level to prevent both new entry and existing fringes’ expansion. Domi-
nance based on cost advantage is pro-competitive because in the market, con-
sumer welfare can be improved by low prices. Therefore, the cost-advantage-
supported ability to hinder competitors’ expansion not inherently anti-
competitive. This is why the Commission will take into account “the financial 
strength of the merged entity relative to its rivals”120. 
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3.1.7 Merger Eliminates an Important Competitive Force 
In some markets, a competitor is particularly aggressive and has driven the 
market to be more competitive than it would have been otherwise. This com-
petitor is a maverick. “Maverick” is an economics term to describe an aggres-
sive competitor whose product is deemed by customers as a close substitute 
for that of another party. A maverick may be able to maintain a competitive 
market price because it is so eager to expand its market share that it always 
uses aggressive competition strategies, e.g. lowering price, promoting quality, 
and developing new technology.  It does not have to be large to act as an im-
portant competitive force in the market, and often, small competitors have 
more incentives to compete aggressively. Thus, a merger that removes a mav-
erick may significantly change the nature and intensity of competition. 
Schneider v Commission supports that if the rivalry between the parties was 
extremely significant, "the merger will be to eliminate a key factor in competi-
tion"121. The Commission has identified two specific “mavericks” in its horizon-
tal merger guidelines: promising new-comers and important innovation driv-
ers.122 
A new or potential entrant can form an important competitive force even 
with a very small or no market share. Empirical studies have supported the 
idea that although potential competition is less effective than actual competi-
tion, it can still be competitive.123  In some cases, even if the merger did not 
create any horizontal overlap in certain markets, the Commission still assess 
the effects of merger on potential competition. The Commission explains the  
conditions under which eliminating a potential competitor may cause concerns 
as follows:  
“…in order to assess whether the elimination of DB/EWS as potential competi-
tors on each other’s market may have significant anticompetitive effects, two 
conditions would have to be fulfilled: i) the potential competitor would have to 
already exert a significant constraining influence or there would have to be a 
significant likelihood that it would grow into an effective competitive force and 
ii) there is not a sufficient number of other potential competitors which could 
maintain sufficient competitive pressure after the merger.”124 
Additionally, in some markets innovation is an important competition force 
because innovation can alter market structure given that “rapid technological 
change leads to markets in which firms compete through innovation for tem-
porary market dominance, from which they may be displaced by the next wave 
of product advancements”.125 However, neither economic theories nor empiri-
cal data have demonstrated whether innovation would increase competition, 
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because the rapid pace of innovation may have two seemingly contradictory 
results: preventing monopoly or creating a strong monopoly.126 Likewise, a 
merger’s effect on innovation is ambiguous. A merger may increase the 
merged entity’s ability and incentive to innovate, whereas in other cases, it 
may hinder innovation by eliminating an innovation driver. The result de-
pends on the specific facts of the case.   
3.2 Horizontal Effects: Coordinated Effects 
Coordinated effects in the merger context involve tacit collusion, which occurs 
when the merged firm’s unilateral price increase “is not profitable unless there 
are accommodating responses by other significant competitors”.127 Firms act 
individually, but in recognition of their interdependence, they manage to com-
bine their market power. The phenomenon of coordinated effects has also 
been referred to as “creating or strengthening a collective dominant position” 
under the EU merger control. In addition to enhancing an individual firm's 
market power, a merger may magnify oligopoly problems in the market by 
creating or strengthening a collective dominant position. A merger may make 
coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms that coordinate in 
advance.128  
The key to the investigation of coordinated effects in a merger context is to 
learn 1) whether collusion is likely to be feasible, and 2) why the merger makes 
coordination more likely.129 For collusion to be feasible, three conditions must 
be presented: 1) the firms must be able to reach consensus; 2) the coordinating 
firms must be able to detect deviations, and 3) if there is a deviation, there 
must be a creditable punishment.130   
3.2.1 Reaching terms of coordination 
The prerequisite for collective dominance is reaching terms of coordination. If 
firms can not arrive at an agreement about how coordination should work, e.g., 
which actions would be considered to be aligned with their coordination, there 
cannot be collective dominance. In Exxon / Mobil, the Commission found that 
in the Luxembourg market, seven motor-fuel retailers systematically adapted 
their prices to the maximum price set by the government and the price cap 
fixed by the Luxembourg government provided firms a benchmark for coordi-
nating.  
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The EU Horizontal Merger Notice notes that coordination between firms is 
more likely in a less complex, more stable market.131 When assessing coordi-
nated effect, the Commission ascertains whether the market structure is con-
ductive to collective dominance. In SCA / Metsä Tissue, the market demand 
for tissue products is relatively inelastic and technical innovation is relatively 
moderate; these two factors are considered as market characteristics condu-
cive to collective dominance.132 
Moreover, coordination is easier to achieve in a symmetric market in terms 
of market share, cost structures, capacity levels.133 In Nestle / Perrier, the 
Commission notes that in a symmetric duopoly,  
“Any aggressive competitive action by one would have a direct and significant 
impact on the activity of the other and most certainly provoke strong reactions 
with the result that such actions could considerably harm both suppliers in their 
profitability without improving their sales volumes. Their reciprocal depend-
ency thus creates a strong common interest and incentive to maximize profits by 
engaging in anti-competitive parallel behaviour.”134  
3.2.2 Deterrent mechanisms 
Coordination normally requires coordinating firms to accommodate to a price 
higher than the competitive level. Firms may find that if they individually 
lower prices, they could make higher profits. To sustain coordination, coordi-
nating firms should be convinced that consequences of deviation are suffi-
ciently severe. The Commission has made it clear in BP / E.ON that "the retalia-
tion mechanism must be sufficiently plausible and effective to counterbalance the 
existing degree of probability and incentives to deviate in the market situation of the 
individual case".135  
Deterrent mechanisms are plausible only when coordinating firms believes 
in the deterrents’ credibility. If firms do not believe that punishment would be 
severe or there would be any retaliation, deviations are highly likely. In Air 
Liquide / Messer Targets, selective undercutting has been identified as a likely 
and effective retaliation in the German bulk markets.136 
3.2.3 Monitoring deviations 
Credible deterrent mechanisms have the ability to prevent coordinating firms 
from deviating only when the deviations can be timely detected. To catch de-
viations in a timely fashion, markets need to be sufficiently transparent.137 In 
Airtours, the CFI requires that to determine whether firms are coordinating 
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their actions, the Commission must establish that each coordinating firm has 
the ability to gain information about other members’ behaviour.138 
The key element of evaluating market transparency is to "identify what firms 
can infer about the actions of other firms from the available information".139 In 
MCI WorldCom / Sprint, product homogeneity and the price transparency 
prices made it easy for firms to monitor their competitors’ behaviour, and the 
excess refining capacity renders retaliation plausible.140 
3.2.4 Reactions of outsiders 
The three conditions described above are analyzed from the coordinating 
firms' perspectives. Sometimes, the outsiders, e.g., non-coordinating firms, 
potential competitors and customers, can jeopardise coordination by their 
reactions. For instance, the price increases resulting from coordination may 
induce potential competitors to enter the market. The countervailing buy 
power may also make coordination between sellers less likely. The Commis-
sion did not find coordinated effects in the newsprint market in Enso / Stora 
partly because there is some potential competition from Canada and some of 
the largest buyers appear to have countervailing purchasing power.141  
3.3 Vertical Effects 
Vertical mergers are mergers between firms that operate at different levels of 
the supply chain. In contrast to horizontal mergers which might either directly 
eliminate competition, or increase the scope of collusion, vertical mergers are 
less likely to harm competition. Normally, a vertical merger will have negative 
effects on competition if the merged firm may make it difficult for its competi-
tors to access to production supplies or distribution channel. 
The anticompetitive effects of a vertical merger are either to increase com-
petitors’ costs or to decrease competitors’ revenue.142 These effects are associ-
ated with the foreclosure of input or customers. Input foreclosure will increase 
rivals’ costs and customer foreclosure will decrease rivals’ revenues. 
On 28th November 2007, the Commission issued Guidelines on the assess-
ment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings (the EU Non-horizontal Merger No-
tice) to elaborate the appraisal process on vertical and conglomerate merg-
ers.143 The EU Non-horizontal Merger Notice notes that non-horizontal merg-
ers are "less likely to significantly impede effective competition" both because 
no competition is directly eliminated and because efficiency gains are pro-
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vided.144 In assessing the anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers, pimarily 
foreclosure, the Commission first examines the merged firm’s ability to fore-
close access to input or customers and second examines that firm’s incentive to 
do so.145  
3.3.1 Ability to foreclose access 
Foreclosure could be workable only when there are very few (or no) alterna-
tives for competitors besides the resources, input or customers controlled by 
the merged firm. An investigation of input foreclosure focuses on alternative 
supply sources and switching costs, whereas customer foreclosure focuses on 
the distribution channels of other upstream firms. Supply foreclosure was 
found in E.ON / MOL,146 in which the Commission concluded that the merged 
firm would have the ability to foreclose its competitors’ access to wholesale gas, 
because E.ON would be the only gas retailer with access to the TOP import 
contracts for MOL WMT on Hungary’s post-merger market.147 In addition, 
customer foreclosure was identified in ENBW/ EN / GVS148. The Commission 
found that EnBW's subsidiary NWS is one of GVS’s ten shareholders, with a 
stake of 33.40% and thus, the merger would secure GVS's sale to NWS, which 
would create a certain degree of customer foreclosure.149 
3.3.2 Incentive to foreclose access 
A firm's incentive to foreclose depends on the degree to which it is profit-
able.150 Increased downstream sales should not only compensate for decreased 
upstream sales but also create more profit for the merged firm. In NESTE / 
IVO, the merged firm would be  able to compensate for a decrease in natural 
gas sales volumes through increased electricity sales and its decision about 
pricing natural gas would be of crucial importance, not only in the market for 
natural gas sales, but also in the wholesale electricity market.151 This could cre-
ate an incentive to foreclose.  
3.3.3 Coordinated effects 
Vertical mergers might have the potential to facilitate market coordination. 
Collusion requires market transparency. Vertical integration enables a firm to 
obtain full information of both its up- and down-stream market. This informa-
tion will allow the firm to communicate, more easily monitoring its rivals. The 
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Commission has discussed this type of concern in Accor / Hilton / Six Conti-
nents.152  
3.4 Conglomerate Effects 
Conglomerate mergers are mergers between firms that have no existing or 
potential competitive relationship as competitors, suppliers or customers.153 
The parties to a conglomerate merger operate in different markets, with no 
horizontal or vertical overlap, so conglomerate mergers generally will not lead 
to any competition problems.  
Competition concerns about conglomerate effects are very special cases and 
are based primarily on the theory of portfolio effects (or range effects in the 
US), which is based on the theory that “the market power deriving from a port-
folio of brand exceeds the sum of its parts”.154 That is to say, a firm may extend 
its market power in one market to another by tying, bundling or other prac-
tices. This type of action could end competition if the firm has a dominant po-
sition in a production market. For example, Firm 1 produces two closely re-
lated products A and B, where A provides Firm 1 with a dominant position.  
Firm 1 can then bundle products A and B as a package offer. Because of the 
popularity of A, most customers might choose the bundling product instead of 
buying B from other suppliers. In this way, Firm 1 expands its market power in 
A’s product market to B’s product market.  
Conglomerate merger appraisal focuses on mergers between firms active in 
closely related markets,155 where the merged firm could possibly leverage its 
strong market position from one market to another by tying, bundling or other 
practices. The Commission has raised concerns about conglomerate effects 
that fall into in this group only a very few cases, e.g., General Electric / Hon-
eywell and Procter & Gamble / Gillette. In Procter & Gamble / Gillette, the 
Commission identified several brands of the parties to be "must stock brands" 
that would enable the merged firm to leverage its market power from these 
market to others.156   
The conglomerate effects identified by the Commission are controversial in 
both academic and legal practise.  Some competition concerns about conglom-
erate effects have been overruled by the CFI, e.g., Tetra pak / Alfa-Laval and 
General Electric / Honeywell.  
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3.5 Merger Remedies Addressing Different Competition Con-
cerns 
The first article of this dissertation reported quantitative research identifying 
the Commission’s most frequently accepted merger remedies for each type of 
competition concerns. The results show that horizontal effects are more likely 
to require structural remedies, such as transfer commitments and exit com-
mitments, whereas vertical effects are more likely to require behavioural 
remedies, such as supply commitments and access commitments. 
 
Figure 2. Frequently accepted remedies and competition concerns 
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4. EU Merger Control and Article 102 
4.1 The Origin of EU Merger Control 
Prior to the ECMR, merger control in Europe was mainly within the purview of 
national competition authorities. Although the Treaty of Rome157 that estab-
lished the European Economic Community grants the Commission extensive 
regulatory power in other areas of competition law, it does not contain any 
express merger control provisions and is silent about the Commission’s au-
thority over merger control. The principal competition law rules are contained 
in Articles 101 and 102, TFEU. Article 101 prohibits agreements or concerted 
practices between undertakings that restrict and distort competition within 
EU. Article 102 bans the abuse of a dominant position by one or a group of 
undertakings insofar as it may affect trade between member states. The Com-
mission attempted to control mergers that affected competition at Community 
level with Articles 101 and 102. 158 Article 102 was used to stop acquisitions by 
firms that enjoyed a dominant position in the Community or a substantial part 
of it. Moreover, the acquisition of a minority share might be caught by Article 
101.159 The Commission’s position in this regard was upheld by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in Continental Can160 (1971). However, Articles 101 and 
102 are not sufficient to control all concentrations that may prove incompati-
ble with the common market.161 Obviously, the direct use of Articles 101 and 
102 to control mergers has numberous limitations, for example, Article 102 
could not be applied if the acquiring company did not have a dominant posi-
tion.  
To solve this problem, the ECMR was adopted in 1989 to establish a Com-
munity-level merger control system to assess mergers with a Community di-
mension on competition grounds. This represented a significant transfer of 
authority from member states to the Community. Based on the “one-stop 
shop” principle, the Commission has the sole authority to assess mergers with 
a Community dimension and its merger decisions are valid throughout the EU.  
From then on, merger control operated independently under EU competition 
law, as one of the four main policy areas together with Article 101 (control of 
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collusion), Article 102 (prevention of abuse of dominant position) and control 
of state aid.  
4.2 A Comparison between EU Merger Control and Antitrust 
Practices 
4.2.1 Similarity 
Among the four policy areas of EU competition law, the practice of merger 
control and Article 102 are more similar than the other two because of their 
consideration of dominance. In both merger and antitrust cases, it is crucial to 
determine whether the firm(s) concerned might create/strengthen or have 
already enjoyed a dominant position in either the common market or a sub-
stantial part of it.  
The substantive test of EU merger control is whether a merger would “sig-
nificantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substan-
tial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position”.162 Therefore, a merger with a Community dimension that 
creates or strengthens a dominant position should be declared incompatible 
with the common market. It has been found that “a significant impediment to 
effective competition generally results from the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position.” 163  In most fully-invested merger cases, a competitive 
analysis establishes whether a dominant position would be created or 
strengthened by the merger.  
In antitrust cases, it is also necessary to define a dominant position in anti-
trust cases. Because Article 102 will only condemn the abusive behaviours of a 
firm in a dominant position, an antitrust investigation should establish two 
factors: a dominant position and abusive conduct. The Commission’s current 
approach to assessing abusive conduct is a two-step process: first, to deter-
mine whether the firm in question enjoys a dominant position; and second, if 
dominance is identified, to assess whether the firm’s behaviour is abusive. 
4.2.2 The difference 
Although the practices of merger control and Article 102 serve the same pur-
poses, they have difference related to their intervention time and targets. 
Ex ante v.s. Ex post 
Merger control and Article 102 provide competition with two types of protec-
tion to competition: ex ante and ex post. Merger control works ex ante. It as-
sesses the merger’s consequences before they occur. Article 102 operates ex 
post by detecting violation on the basis of the facts of a firm’s actual conduct in 
a particular situation.  
The ex ante nature of merger control makes it a very powerful competition 
policy tool. Pursuant to the ECMR, merging firms must notify the Commission 
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before implementing a merger within a week of concluding a merger agree-
ment or making a public announcement of the transaction, and the merger 
should then be suspended until it has been declared compatible with the 
common market.164 The prior notification and suspension of transactions have 
changed the game and given the Commission considerable leverage to demand 
remedies. First, merger investigation can take several months. In the EU, the 
phase I investigation may take one or two month (the latter, if remedies are 
proposed), whereas if the phase II investigation is triggered, the delay can be 
prolonged for several additional months. Second, suspension extends to the 
entire merger. Even if competition concerns were only raised in one or two 
relevant markets, merger activities in other markets also pause until the con-
cerned markets are cleared. Consequently, to accelerate the investigation proc-
ess, the merging firms may choose to actively cooperate with the Commission 
and accommodate their remedies design to materially fulfil the Commission’s 
expectation.  
Article 102, in contrast, involves ex post correction. The Commission makes 
decisions based on firms’ actual behaviours. To condemn an antitrust in-
fringement, the Commission must establish that the specific behaviour(s) of a 
dominant firm is abusive. It does not have the leverage of suspending any of 
the firm’s business before Article 102 violation is confirmed. The Commis-
sion’s intervention and the threat of enormous fines might lead the firm to 
commit to behavioural remedies, but this remains far different from requiring 
it to change its corporate structure.  
Potential effect v.s. Actual behaviour 
Merger control and Article 102 have different targets, potential effects and 
actual behaviours.  
Merger control intends to detect a merger’s potentially negative effects on 
competition. For instance, if the Commission proves that a dominant position 
would be created, the merger is unacceptable. There is no further requirement 
to demonstrate the specific competition problem that may be casued by the 
negative effect. 
Conversely, Article 102 aims at preventing a firm in a dominant position 
from abusing its position. Under Article 102, a dominant position held by one 
or more firms is not illegal per se; only abuse of a dominant position is forbid-
den. Thus, the focus of Article 102 is unitary behaviours. To condemn an anti-
trust infringement under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission must 
establish that a dominant firm has committed specific abusive behaviour(s) 
has been committed in the past.  
4.3 Antitrust Remedy  
Regulation 1/2003 has empowered the Commission to impose any remedy, 
whether behavioural or structural, to bring the infringement of Article 101 and 
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102 effectively to an end.165 Remedies can be imposed under either Article 7 or 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. These two articles have varied provisions on 
the adoption of remedies and the Commission has the discretion to decide 
which procedure it will follow when making a decision.   
4.3.1 Remedies under Article 7 
According to Article 7, the Commission may impose any behavioural or struc-
tural remedies that are both proportionate to the infringement committed and 
necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end, but “structural 
remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behav-
ioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be 
more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.” 
First, the remedies under Article 7 should be imposed by the Commission on 
its own initiative and based on the findings of an infringement of Article 101 or 
102 TFEU. The Commission has to adduce evidence in its decision for both the 
condemnation of an unlawful behaviour and the suitability of the remedies 
imposed. 
Second, Article 7 sets a high bar for the adoption of structural remedies. 
Structural remedies can only be used as a last resort by the Commission to 
cease and deter similar infringements when there is no equally effective behav-
ioural remedy. As indicated by Regulation 1/2003, a structural remedy that 
changes an undertaking’s structure can be proportionate only when “there is a 
substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement derives from the very 
structure of the undertaking.166 One way to justify the adoption of a structural 
remedy is to find that the firm concerned has previousely committed similar 
infringement. Repeated, abusive conduct by the same dominant firm suggests 
that the behavioural remedies adopted in the previous cases have failed and 
more drastic measures, i.e., structural remedies, are warranted.  
Third, the text of Article 7 establishes the principle of proportionality as a 
rule for remedies. Under Article 7, the Commission must impose remedies 
“which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to 
bring the infringement effectively to an end.”167 
4.3.2 Remedies under Article 9 
According to Article 9,  if the Commission intends to adopt a decision requir-
ing that an infringement be stopped and the undertakings concerned offer 
commitments to resolve the concerns expressed in the Commission’s prelimi-
nary assessment, the Commission may decide to make commitments binding 
on the undertakings. There is no limitation on the adoption of structural 
remedies.  
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First, Article 9 remedies are offered by the concerned firm, and the Commis-
sion may decide whether or not to accept those remedies. If the Commission 
accepts the remedies, it shall decide whether to make the remedies legally 
binding on the firm. 
Second, the purpose of Article 9 remedies is not to condemn infringement, 
but to alleviate the concerns expressed by the Commission in its preliminary 
assessment. Remedies are proposed in the course of antitrust investigation 
and do not support the existence of unlawful behaviours. Once the Commis-
sion accepts the remedies, the investigation is ended. It is worth noting that a 
decision under Article 9 does not conclude whether there has been an in-
fringement, and the appropriateness of the remedies is assessed in light of the 
concerns expressed in the Commission’s preliminary assessment.  
Third, according to Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission cannot 
impose both fines and remedies in an Article 9 decision because it has made 
no conclusion about the existence of antitrust conduct or cartel infringement. 
Once the Commission accepts the remedies proposed by the concerned firm, it 
should terminate its investigation and cannot levy any fine unless the firm vio-
lates the remedy agreement.  
Fourth, the principle of proportionality is not mentioned in Article 9. This 
does not mean that the Commission can neglect making a proportionality as-
sessment for Article 9 remedies. The Court of First Instance (CFI) clearly 
noted in its Alrosa judgment that although Article 9 does not refer to the prin-
ciple of proportionality, the Commission is obliged to comply with that princi-
ple when it adopts decisions based on Article 9.168  
That said, the extent of proportionality assessment is different under Article 
7 and 9.  The CFI once held that Article 7 should serve as a reference for the 
extent of the commitments accepted under Article 9,169 but this conclusion has 
been overruled by the ECJ in its Alrosa appeal judgement.170 The ECJ con-
firms the different application of the principle of proportionality under these 
two provisions. Under Article 9, the Commission’s obligation with respect to 
the principle of proportionality ‘is confined to verifying that the commitments 
in question address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned 
and that they have not offered less onerous commitments that also address 
those concerns adequately.’171 The ECJ further confirms that under Article 9, 
‘the Commission has a wide discretion to make a proposed commitment bind-
ing or to reject it.’172 In practice, the Commission’s proportionality assessment 
considers whether remedies are voluntarily proposed by the concerned firm.173  
In sum, antitrust remedies can be adopted under either Article 7 or 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003. In contrast, Article 7 has stricter requirements for the con-
demnation of violations and the proportionality of remedies. Article 7 reme-
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dies are expected to effectively put an end to an infringement, but Article 9 
remedies need only address the concerns expressed in the Commission’s pre-
liminary assessment. Article 9 provides a sort of shortcut to or bypass of anti-
trust remedies, particularly structural remedies, avoiding the strict stipulation 
in Article 7. In antirust cases, structural remedies have only been imposed in 
the context of Article 9 decisions, and they remain unknown under Article 7. 
4.4 Differences in Remedy Practice under EU Merger Control and 
Article 102 
Remedies adopted under merger control and Article 102 have the same pur-
pose, which is to relieve potentially competitive detriments to preserve the 
efficiencies.174 However, the practice of remedy policy in these two areas is 
varied, e.g., structural remedies are preferred in merger cases, whereas they 
are strictly limited in antitrust. 
4.4.1 Preference for Structural Remedies in Merger Control 
Structural remedies are preferred to behavioural remedies in EU merger con-
trol.  The EU Merger Remedies Notice indicates that structural remedies are 
preferable because of their structural nature, which is more suitable to achieve 
the basic aim of commitments: i.e., ensuring competitive market structures.175  
The ICN Merger Remedies Review notes that, compared to a behavioural 
remedy, a structural remedy is likely to be more effective because it directly 
dissolves the source of the competitive harm directly and causes lower ongoing 
monitoring costs or possible market distortion, which is why, at least for hori-
zontal mergers, many jurisdictions consider structural remedies preferable to 
behavioural remedies.176  
The results of this study’s first article confirmed the predominance of struc-
tural remedies in EU conditional merger decisions. That article shows that 
from 1990 to 2008, the Commission made 88 phase II conditional clearance 
decisions; 75% of the competition concerns of those cases were resolved by 
divestiture remedies.177 More specifically, transfer commitments are the most 
popular remedy for non-coordinated horizontal effects, and exit commitments 
are the best for coordinated horizontal effects, such as supply commitments 
for vertical effects.178 
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4.4.2 The Limited Use of Structural Remedies in Antitrust Cases 
Conversely, structural remedies are very rare under Article 102. Because the 
Commission began to fight the abuse of dominant positions in the 1960s, it 
never required or imposed any structural remedies until 2008. Regulation 17, 
the processor of Regulation 1/2003, was silent with respect to whether reme-
dies might be adopted under Article 102. It was not until 2003 that Regulation 
1/2003 explicitly allowed the adoption of remedies under Articles 101 and 102.   
In light of Regulation 1/2003, structural remedies can be adopted as a last 
resort only when there is no equally effective behavioural remedy available or 
where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome 
than a structural remedy.179 The first structural remedy was accepted in E.ON 
Electricity (2008).180   
4.4.3 Reasons 
This study’s third article gives four reasons for the different treatment of struc-
tural remedies under merger control and Article 102.181  
(1) Regulatory Empowerment: 2004 v. 1990 
The first reason for this situation is EU secondary law accepts structural 
remedies for merger control in 1989, but not for antitrust until 2003. 
(2) Objectives of Correction: Behaviours v. Incentive 
The second reason is related to the differing objectives of antitrust and 
merger control. Merger control enables competition authorities to regulate 
changes in market structure, in particular, concentration, and Article 102 aims 
at preventing a firm in a dominant position from abusing its position. 
(3) Time of Intervention: ex-post v. ex-ante 
The third reason lies in the differing time of intervention between antitrust 
and merger control. Merger control and Article 102 provide two kinds of pro-
tection to competition, ex-ante and ex-post. 
(4) Practical Difficulties: Divestiture v. Fines 
The fourth and the most obvious reason might be the practical difficulties of 
splitting a unitary firm without causing efficiency loss. The clear demarcations 
between the merging firms facilitate application of structural remedies. 
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5. Designing Merger Remedies under the 
Entire Competition Law Structure  
Remedies are a tool used by the competition authorities to correct and disci-
pline firms’ conducts; most importantly, however, they are a mechanism to 
realise the purposes of competition law. Merger remedies prevent potential 
competitive harms while enabling other efficiencies and competitive benefits. 
Conversely, merger remedies are always accompanied by direct costs, indirect 
costs and potential efficiency losses.  
Merger remedy design is a complex process and depends on every perspec-
tive of the delicate situations involved in each case. It can be more challenging 
than determining whether a merger is harmful because it requires a far more 
complex, forward-looking assessment of all unlawful conduct that could create 
the same anticompetitive effects under plausible future circumstances. 
“The call for a more dynamic approach is confounding because there is no learn-
ing presently available—nothing ready to wear, as it were—to give a greater 
temporal dimension to the analysis of a proposed merger or to the long-run ef-
fects of a business practice.”182 
Accordingly, remedy designs need a systematic and consistent framework 
based on an effective competition law policy. An effective system only func-
tions through consistent, balanced ex ante and ex post enforcement. Merger 
remedy design should be considered under the entire EU competition law 
structure. There are at least three ways to achieve this goal. The first is to co-
ordinate remedy practise under merger control and antitrust, the second is to 
consider Article 102 when designing merger remedy, and the third is to post-
pone the implementiation of merger remedies on conditions. 
5.1 EU Competition Law Structure 
The first modern competition law, the Sherman Act, was passed in the US in 
1890; it was intended to combat against big trusts and monopolization.183 Sec-
tion 1 of the Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade, and section 2 bans monopolization, conspiracies and attempts 
to monopolize. The Clayton Act was passed in 1914 to stop mergers or acquisi-
tions that are likely to substantially lessen competition. The EU competition 
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law system built after the World War II adopted a structure similar to that of 
the US. The EU competition law has three main policy areas, which are also 
referred as three pillars, i.e., Article 101, Article 102 and the ECMR. 
Although guided by different competition rules, the three policy areas to-
gether form a dynamic competition system.  
First, the three areas serve the same purpose: preventing the distortion of 
competition in the common market. 
Second, the three areas apply the same economic and legal analysis tools and 
therefore, one area’s experiences and lessons can be shared by the other areas.   
Third, the three areas address different anti-competitive activities and com-
plement each other in preserving competition. Article 101 prevents anti-
competitive activities by two or more undertakings. Article 102 stops abusive 
conduct by, in most cases, a single dominant firm. ECMR monitors mergers. 
Jointly, the three policy areas build a safety net for market competition.   
Fourth, the three areas supervise business at all stages. Article 102 governs 
undertakings that already hold dominant positions. The ECMR governs under-
takings that are attempting to obtain or strengthen dominant positions 
through mergers. Article 101 shows no preference for any particular business 
stage. In the course of its development, an undertaking may experience more 
competition-related discipline. 
5.2 The Convergence of Remedies Practice under Competition 
Law 
Although structural remedies are more favourable in merger cases whereas 
behavioural remedies are more favorable in cases of abusive misconduct, the 
principles of an appropriate remedy are the same. The application of a remedy 
under competition law should be consistent, that is, if it is applicable, the same 
competition harm should be resolved by the same type of remedies under 
similar terms. The experience gained through remedy design in one policy area 
may be shared with the other policy area to help create better remedies in the 
other instrument.184 
A clear example is the first antitrust case closed with structural remedies, 
E.ON Electricity.185 A structural solution was used to fix the problem because 
the abusive behaviours were derived from the structure of the market.186 The 
Commission’s investigation ended with the first divestiture remedy package 
accepted under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. The divestiture experience ob-
tained by the Commission in merger control must have provided good support 
for this first antitrust divesture remedy. 
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Experience may also flow from antitrust to merger control. For example, in 
Intel/ McAfee, Intel undertook to ensure that, on an ongoing basis and in a 
timely manner, instruction, interoperability, and optimization information is 
documented and available for use by third-party vendors of endpoint security 
software on a royalty-free basis.187 The Commission found that this would be 
an effective solution based on both market testing and its experience in Micro-
soft.188 
The third article in this study, Compulsory Licensing as Antitrust and 
Merger Remedy in EU, argues that the experience of remedy design in the 
area of compulsory licensing should be shared between merger control and 
antitrust.  
5.3 Considering Article 102 in Merger Assessment 
In light of the applicable rules, when assessing the likelihood of post-merger 
conduct that would hinder effective competition in a relevant market, the 
Commission should analyse both its possible anti-competitive effects and the 
relevant countervailing factors.189 The deterrent effects of the competition law 
and other relevant rules may help prevent the occurrence of anti-competitive 
behaviours. There is also a question of whether the Commission should con-
sider the deterrent effect of Article 102 when assessing the possibility that 
merging firms might adopt a particular type of abusive behaviour. If that is the 
case, what should the Commission do?    
These issues were considered first in Tetra Laval I.190 The CFI ruled that in 
the Commission’s merger analysis, it should consider the likelihood of compli-
ance with Article 102.  
“When the Commission, in assessing the effects of such a merger, relies on fore-
seeable conduct which in itself is likely to constitute abuse of an existing domi-
nant position, it is required to assess whether, despite the prohibition of such 
conduct, it is none the less likely that the entity resulting from the merger will 
act in such a manner or whether, on the contrary, the illegal nature of the con-
duct and/or the risk of detection will make such a strategy unlikely. While it is 
appropriate to take account, in its assessment, of incentives to engage in anti-
competitive practices, … the Commission must also consider the extent to which 
those incentives would be reduced, or even eliminated, owing to the illegality of 
the conduct in question, the likelihood of its detection, action taken by the com-
petent authorities, both at Community and national level, and the financial pen-
alties which could ensue.”191 
The Commission appealed to the ECJ in 2003 and the ECJ handed down its 
decision in Tetra Laval II in 2005.192 The ECJ held that the CFI was right to 
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decide that the likelihood of a merged firm’s adopting abusive conduct must be 
examined comprehensively.193 The ECJ also noted that requiring such an ex-
tensities examination by the CFI “would run counter to the Regulation’s pur-
pose of prevention”.194  
“It follows that, at the stage of assessing a proposed merger, an assessment in-
tended to establish whether an infringement of Article 82 EC is likely and to as-
certain that it will be penalised in several legal orders would be too speculative 
and would not allow the Commission to base its assessment on all of the rele-
vant facts with a view to establishing whether they support an economic sce-
nario in which a development such as leveraging will occur.”195 
Neither Tetra Laval I nor Tetra Laval II indicated whether considering Article 
102 in a merger assessment should be confined to the conglomerate effect or 
whether instead it should be generally applied to all types of mergers. In the 
later GE case, when discussing a merger’s vertical effect, the CFI followed 
Tetra Laval II and held that the Commission should consider the potentially 
deterrent effect of Article 102 based on evidence available at the time.196 
“The Commission must, in principle, take into account the potentially unlawful, 
and thus sanctionable, nature of certain conduct as a factor which might dimin-
ish, or even eliminate, incentives for an undertaking to engage in particular 
conduct. That appraisal does not, however, require an exhaustive and detailed 
examination of the rules of the various legal orders which might be applicable 
and of the enforcement policy practised within them, given that an assessment 
intended to establish whether an infringement is likely and to ascertain that it 
will be penalised in several legal orders would be too speculative. 
…… 
It follows that, although the Commission is entitled to take as its basis a sum-
mary analysis, based on the evidence available to it at the time when it adopts its 
merger-control decision, of the lawfulness of the conduct in question and of the 
likelihood that it will be punished, it must none the less, in the course of its ap-
praisal, identify the conduct foreseen and, where appropriate, evaluate and take 
into account the possible deterrent effect represented by the fact that the con-
duct would be clearly, or highly probably, unlawful under Community law.”197 
These cases indicate that when assessing the likelihood of post-merger con-
duct, particularly in vertical and conglomerate merger cases, which could hin-
der effective competition in a relevant market, the competition agencies 
should consider not only the factors that might trigger unlawful behaviour but 
also the deterrent effects of the competition law and other relevant rules. 
5.4 Postponing the Implementation of Merger Remedies on Con-
ditions 
Typically, merger remedies are fully provided in the commitments made by the 
merged firms to the Commission, containing specific conditions and obliga-
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tions that the parties must take to render the merger compatible with the 
common market.  Becaue the purpose of merger remedies is to remove con-
cerns about likely anti-competitive effects, a merger remedy should prevent 
the merged firm from anti-competitive activities by countering the merger’s 
effects on incentives. In other words, well-crafted merger remedies suppress 
the merged firm’s incentive to act against competition rules.  
Like the ex post discipline under Article 102, merger remedies are a deter-
rent mechanism to prevent a merged firm from engaging in unilateral anti-
competitive behaviours following the merger. It has been observed that merger 
remedies (even those that are merely behavioural) that are attached to a 
merger decision are more effective than excessive reliance on Article 102 and 
constitute an instrument superior to Article 102.198 If an optimal remedy is the 
one that produces the greatest overall efficiency gains net of enforcement and 
administrative costs,199 assessment of the efficacy of merger remedies should 
be made in the context of the entire competition law system, not just one pol-
icy area.  
“A weaker ex-post enforcement means an increased likelihood of false nega-
tives, i.e., situations where competition law should have been used but was not 
(for various reasons).”200 To resolve this problem, merger control has been 
introduced with strong ex-ante intervention. The strong ex-ante power of 
merger control may compensate the weak antitrust enforcement in some per-
spectives but also bring the risk of false positive where remedies are imple-
mented without an actual competition problem. 
Given the poor quality of the information available when a merger decision is 
adopted, and given that every merger remedy comes with various types of 
costs, I propose an alternative method of enforcing enforce merger remedies: 
conditional merger remedies. Such remedies will not be immediately imple-
mented and their implementation would be triggered only by certain condi-
tions, such as a violation of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.  Conditional merger 
remedies put a merger on probation for a period of time subject to conditions 
imposed by the Commission. Remedies will be enforced only if the merged 
firm violates the conditions during the time frame provided in the merger de-
cision. There should be a time frame for conditional merger remedies and after 
expiration of the time frame, the conditional merger remedy will be no longer 
effective. Like probation adopted in criminal cases, conditional merger reme-
dies should be applicable to the mergers that pose the risk of relatively minor 
harms.  
Conditional merger remedies may be used on the following occasions: 
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1) When divestiture is not proportionate or feasible. For example, if a divesti-
ture is not feasible at the time of the merger review because of lack of a suit-
able purchaser, the Commission may agree to put the divestiture on hold, and 
once the merged firm is found guilty, e.g., under Article 102, the divestiture 
assets will be sold at a very low price to a competitor.  
2) When behavioural remedies requies long-term, costly monitoring. For ex-
ample, the Commission has found that firewalls are virtually impossible to 
monitor;201 therefore, a firewall remedy may be replaced with a conditional 
remedy under which the merged firm shall be penalized with a fine if it is 
found violating Article 101 within e.g., five years.  
3) When a remedy’s impact on efficiencies is unclear. For example, because 
the compulsory license of a patent might have a negative impact on innovative 
efficiency, the Commission and the merged firm may agree that if the merged 
firm violates the obligations provided in the commitment agreement, the pat-
ent will be licensed under more favourable terms, such as free loyalties.    
The purpose of a conditional merger remedy is to suppress the merged firm’s 
incentive to violate competition rules by increasing the price of engaging in 
anti-competition actions. In this way, it attempts to achieve more competitive 
benefits at a lower cost. On the one hand, the postponement of a remedy may 
allow potential efficiency to take place and decrease the potential for false 
negatives. On the other hand, the pre-established commitment agreement can 
save a great deal of the administrative cost of designing and justifying a rem-
edy, particularly a structural remedy, in cartel and antitrust cases. Once the 
Commission has established that the merging firm violates competition rules, 
merger remedies will be enforced automatically.   
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary 
This study reviews EU merger remedy practise and attempts to find a way to 
mitigate the risks of merger remedies. It consists of four articles, each of which 
addresses a specific research question.    
The first article analyses the relationship between merger remedies and 
competition concerns. The empirical results reveal that merger remedy design 
varies for various competition concerns. Horizontal effects require more struc-
tural remedies, such as transfer commitments and exit commitments, whereas 
vertical effects requires more behavioural remedies, such as supply commit-
ments and access commitments. More specifically, the Commission might re-
quire the parties to divest a portion of their overlapping business or assets to 
decrease the merged firm’s market share when it is concerned about non-
coordinated horizontal effects, or to reliquish its stocks in a joint venture to 
break the connection between the parties and their competitors to prevent 
coordinated horizontal effects. Supply commitments and access commitments 
could be good choices to alleviate vertical concerns.  
The second article reviews merger control, particularly merger remedy prac-
tice, in China, compared to the EU approach. It finds that China’s system of 
merger control is clearly patterned on the EU approach andsimultaneously has 
unique Chinese characteristics. MOFCOM (the Chinese merger control 
agency) is struggling both to develop a merger control due process and to forge 
its own approach through daily practice. Compared to the Commission, MOF-
COM is not aggressive, and its approach is relatively conservative and pro-
consumer. However, MOFCOM’s merger decisions continue to lack detail 
about how its conclusions are reached. Thin reasoning in the previous cases 
definitely increased the difficulties of anticipating the outcome of a merger 
assessment. The efficacy of these behavioural remedies might be questionable, 
because of their imprecise terms and lax monitoring measures. The combina-
tion of the Anti-Monopoly Law’s multiple missions and the lack of transpar-
ency in merger review have created grave doubts about the goals of Chinese 
merger control.  
The third article focuses on a specific type of remedy--compulsory licensing-- 
and explores and compares its applications under Article 102 and merger con-
trol. This article explains that although EU antitrust and merger control 
adopted and designed compulsory licenses with significantly different agendas 
and conditions, the purpose of compulsory licensing is consistent: to spur in-
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novation and protect consumer interests. One essential rule of designing a 
compulsory licence is that it is particularly important to strike an appropriate 
balance between preserving innovation incentives and addressing competitive 
detriments. To preserve competition, the mechanisms adopted under either 
Article 102 or merger control should not be confined to a single policy area. 
Antitrust and merger control should share their experience of compulsory li-
censing to ensure the proper application of compulsory licensing under the 
entire competition law system.    
The fourth article explores the extremely different positions of EU antitrust 
and merger control with respect to structural remedies. It argues that the pre-
dominance of structural remedies in EU merger cases is primarily due to the 
Commission’s leverage from prior notification mechanism and the clear de-
marcations between the merging firms that facilitate structural solutions. This 
indicates that EU competition law is not a coherent system because merger 
control is too strong and antitrust is too weak. Remedies, particularly struc-
tural remedies, are tools used by the competition authorities to correct and 
discipline the firms’ conducts, but most importantly, they are mechanisms to 
realise the purposes of competition law. Remedy designs need a systematic 
and consistent framework based on an effective competition law policy. An 
effective system only functions through consistent, balanced ex ante and ex 
post enforcements. Thus, Article 102’s deterrent power should be reinforced to 
increase its ability to fight unilateral anticompetitive behaviours; that said,  
merger control can show more tolerance for efficiency-enhanced mergers. 
6.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, competition remedies, under both merger control and Articles 
101 and 102, relieve potential detriments to competition so that efficiencies 
can be preserved. A remedy decision should balance numberous important, 
sometimes competing, considerations, such as efficacy, proportionality and 
costs. It is fair to say that the adoption of remedies under competition law is 
largely affected by the Commission’s leverage at that time, which is not solely 
based on the merits of the case. Because of the relatively short time window 
and limited information available for the Commission to assess whether a 
merger would significantly impede competition and choose appropriate reme-
dies, the real effects of some remedies may not agree with the Commission’s 
expectation. Moreover, there is a risk that the Commission will be tempted to 
use merger remedies as an opportunity to redistribute resources among firms 
in an industry.  
This study claims that remedy practice under the EU competition law should 
be coherent and consistent and that merger remedies should be considered 
and designed under the entire EU competition law structure, not merger con-
trol alone. It proposes three methods of achieving this goal:  
1) Converging remedies practice under the entire competition law.  
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The application of remedies under competition law should be consistent, 
that is, if applicable, the same competition harm should be resolved by the 
same type of remedies imposed under similar terms. 
2) Considering Article 102 when designing merger remedies. 
The deterrent power of Article 102 should be considered in the merger as-
sessment, particularly in vertical and conglomerate merger cases.   
3) Postponing the implementation of merger remedies on conditions.  
In some cases, the implementation of merger remedies may be postponed on 
conditions, e.g., when concerns are raised in the Commission’s preliminary 
assessment.  
 
6.3 The Significance of This Study 
This study makes a useful contribution to the understanding of EU merger 
remedies in the context of the entire EU competition law structure. Studies on 
merger remedy are rare and very few studies discuss merger remedy design 
from the perspective of the competition law system in its entirety. This study 
fills the gap by exploring the differences between merger remedies and anti-
trust remedies in the EU and offering suggestions improving the appropriate-
ness of merger remedies by harmonising the remedy practise under Article 102 
and the ECMR. It certainly has implications both for policymakers evaluating 
the current EU competition policy and for researchers exploring similar con-
structs for various issues under EU competition law.   
6.4 Future Studies 
Designing competition remedies, especially merger remedies, is always a com-
plex task because remedies should effectively resolve competition problems 
while minimizing the impacts of those remedies on efficiencies. This study 
proposes considering merger remedies under the entire EU competition law 
structure. However, because of both resource limits and practical difficulties, 
this solution will require further assessment (both economic and juristic) of its 
reasonability and applicability. There are a lot of room for future studies. For 
example, in an antitrust case, can fines be imposed if the pre-agreed condi-
tional merger remedies have been triggered? Can other types of measures be 
used as remedies in a competition case?  
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